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Tug gle's case because as in Simmons and Skipper, the uncertainty as to
how the jury relied upon the Commonwealth's tainted, unrebutted
evidence renders the process itself so unreliable and unsound that
Tuggle's death penalty should be vacated. Any effort to engage in
harmless-error analysis would only be an exercise in speculation about
the results of a fundamentally flawed sentencing hearing. This funda-
mental flaw requires that Tuggle's death penalty be vacated despite the
jury's separate finding of vileness.
TUGGLE V. THOMPSON
Summary and analysis by:
Mary E. Eade
57 F.3d 1356 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Lem Davis Tuggle was convicted of capital murder committed
during or subsequent to the rape of Ms. Jessie Geneva Havens. 1 After
being denied certiorari three times by the United States Supreme Court
and after being denied state habeas relief, Tuggle petitioned for federal
habeas relief to the District Court for the Western District of Virginia,
raising ten allegations.
The district court granted relief. The court found, inter alia, that the
vileness instruction was unconstitutionally vague.2 As a result, the court
vacated the sentence and ordered that Tuggle be retried within six
months.3 The Commonwealth appealed.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. As to the adequacy of
the vileness instruction, the court concluded that it met the constitutional




Tuggle challenged the adequacy of the vileness instruction,
arguing that it was unconstitutionally vague. 6 What was particularly
troublesome about the actual instruction was that it had omitted the
words "qualitatively and quantitatively" from the traditional in-
struction (itself arguably vague) employed by Virginia courts to
avoid having the vileness instruction struck down as too vague.
7
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit found that the instruction was not so
vague as to violate Godfrey v. Georgia.
8
1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (Supp. 1995). The full facts of this
case are described in the case summary of Tuggle v. Netherland, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
2 Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356, 1359, 1361 (4th Cir. 1995).
This case note will address only the issue concerning the sufficiency of
the vileness instruction. See the case summary of Tuggle v. Netherland,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue fora discussion of the Fourth Circuit's
error in upholding the death sentence after future dangerousness had
been thrown out.
3 1d. at 1359.
4446 U.S. 420 (1980).
5 Tuggle, 57 F.3d at 1374. The court also ruled on a number of other
issues that will not be addressed in this article. The rulings included
findings that (1) pretrial publicity did not require a change of venue; (2)
any error in denying the right to challenge potential jurors outside the
panel's presence was harmless; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to
support a finding of rape under Virginia law. This third holding was
significant to the court's reversal of the district court's grant of relief,
which had found that the Commonwealth had not established a prima
To justify this finding, the Fourth Circuit distorted the reasoning of
Lowenfield v. Phelps.9 Lowenfield simply held that the purpose of
aggravating circumstances is to narrow the class of persons eligible for
the death penalty and that as long as this narrowing occurs at some point
in the proceedings, the constitutional mandate is met. From this basic
holding, the Fourth Circuit extrapolated the conclusion that "[s]ince
under Virginia law the 'narrowing' is accomplished at both the guilt and
sentencing stage, a defendant is given double protection and more than
the Constitution requires." 10 The Fourth Circuit then erroneously sug-
gested, in dicta, that because two narrowings occur in a Virginia capital
trial, the constitutionwouldbe satisfied even where one of the narrowings
is later found to be unconstitutionally vague.11
Lowenfield does hold that the constitution is satisfied so long as the
narrowing of the class of murderers eligible to receive the death penalty
occurs at some point in the proceedings, whether it be at the guilt or
sentencing phase.12 But to the extent the Fourth Circuit was suggesting
that because in Virginia some narrowing occurs at the guilt phase, any
further narrowing need not be subject to vagueness analysis, it clearly
was wrong.
Lowenfield merely held that the Louisiana capital murder statutory
scheme was constitutional in that it satisfactorily narrowed the class of
death-eligible murderers. 13 Lowenfield had argued that because the
statutory aggravating circumstance which the sentencer had found
merely duplicated an element of the underlying offense of murder, the
death sentence should be void. 14 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that because Louisiana's definition of capital murder itself met constitu-
tional requirements of adequately narrowing who was death eligible, no
further narrowing need occur at the penalty phase.15
But Lowenfield most certainly did not say that if further narrowing
factors are used, those factors are then exempt from a requirement that
facie case of rape because the evidence was insufficient to find penetra-
tion. Id. at 1367-70.
6 1d. at 1372-73.
7 Id. at 1373. Virginia's statutory vileness factor is identical to the
factor struck down as unconstitutionally vague in Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420 (1980). Consequently, Virginia has employed an instruc-
tion that purports to solve the vagueness problem. The instruction usually
given comes fromSmithv. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135
(1978). It defines aggravated battery as, "Battery which, qualitatively
and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to
accomplish an act of murder." Id. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149.
8 Tuggle, 57 F.3d at 1372.
9 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
10 Tuggle, 57 F.3d. at 1374.
11 Id. at 1373-74.
12 Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 241-46.
13 Id. at 244-46.
14 Id. at 241.
15 Id. at 246.
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they be meaningful. Indeed, it would violate Furman to say that once in
the category of people for whom the death penalty is possible, the jury
could be given arbitrary factors to use in choosing whom to actually
impose that penalty upon. Thus, where a state chooses to impose an
additional narrowing, as Virginia does in requiring an aggravating factor
to be found, that narrowing must also be meaningfully guided. That
guidance can only come from an adequate definition.
This constitutional requirement recently was reiterated by the
United States Supreme Court in Tuilaepa v. California.16 In Tuilaepa,
the Court addressed the question of whether certain statutory factors
16 114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994).
17 Id. at 2626.
181d. (quotingJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,279 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
given to the sentencer to consider after a defendant was found'death-
eligible were unconstitutionally vague.17 In order to avoid being vague
and therefore unconstitutional, the Court concluded that the factor must
have some "'common-sense core of meaning... that criminal juries
should be capable of understanding.'
' 18
Although the Court upheld the statutory factors at issue in Tuilaepa,
it still did so only after subjecting them to vagueness analysis. In Tuggle,
the Fourth Circuit was faced with an incomplete version of a vileness
instruction that, even in its complete form, has serious vagueness
problems. To the extent the Fourth Circuit was arguing that a non-vague
definition of vileness was not required because the defendant had already
been convicted of capital murder, its argument would violate the teach-
ings of Tuilaepa and Furman.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary E. Eade
BARNES v. THOMPSON
58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Using an employee of Bon's Supermarket as a shield, Herman
Barnes and accomplice James Corey forced their way into the Hampton
store on June 27, 1985.1 Owner Clyde Jenkins, age seventy-three,
struggledwithBames. Barnes shothim twice. StoreemployeeMohanmed
Afifi, running from the back of the store,jumped on Barnes. Barnes shot
and killed Afifi after shaking him off his back. Jenkins then tried to get
up but Barnes shot him again. When police arrived, they found an unfired
gun under or near Jenkins' body. Jenkins died in the hospital two weeks
later.
2
Jenkins' gun was admitted into evidence at Barnes' trial, but no
witness gave any testimony as to exactly where it was found. The
Circuit Court for the City of Hampton convicted Barnes of capital
murder and subsequently sentenced him to death based on the
"vileness" aggravating factor.3 The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the conviction and death sentence 4 and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 5 Barnes filed a petition with the
Commonwealth for writ of habeas corpus. The Circuit Court for the
City of Hampton dismissed the petition and the Supreme Court of
Virginia denied Barnes' petition for appeal. 6 The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 7
Barnes next filed a habeas petition in federal court, raising the same
issues he had in state court. He also raised a new claim, charging that the
Commonwealth had violated his right to due process under Brady v.
Maryland8 and United States v.Bagley9 by failing to disclose the specific
location of Jenkins' gun.10 Barnes moved to dismiss his first petition and
filed a new one in state court, raising the Brady claim. 11 The state court
I Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1995).
21Id.
3Id.
4 Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196 (1987).
5 Barnes v. Virginia, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988).
6Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 973.
7 Barnes v. Thompson, 497 U.S. 1011 (1990).
8 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
10 Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 973.
11 UnderRose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), Barnes had to exhaust
dismissed it on the ground that, pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-
654(B)(2), writs are not to be granted based on facts the petitioner knew
about and could have included in previous petitions.
12
Barnes filed his second federal habeas petition in 1992. The
district court dismissed seven of his ten assignments of error, but
ordered an evidentiary hearing on the other three: the Brady claim;
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and a claim that the death
penalty had been improperly imposed if the victim had been armed.
13
The court granted Barnes relief on the Brady claim, finding that
although the suppression of the evidence concerning the victim's
gun was not sufficient to undermine confidence in Barnes' capital
murder conviction, it was sufficient to undermine confidence in the
death sentence. The district court vacated the sentence accordingly,
finding specifically that if Barnes had had evidence of the gun's
location at trial, the trial court might not have found he had commit-
ted an aggravated battery and might not have found "vileness."
14
The district court denied Barnes relief on his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. The Commonwealth appealed, contending that the
district court had erred in failing to find that Barnes had procedurally
defaulted the Brady claim under Virginia Code section 8.01-
654(B)(2). 15 Barnes cross-appealed the denial of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
16
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the judgment of the district court as to the Brady claim, finding that
Barnes had procedurally defaulted it, and had failed to show cause for the
all his state remedies before proceeding to federal court. Since he had not
raised the Brady claim previously at the state level, he had to do so before
bringing his entire case to federal court. The Brady claim is referred to
as a "Bagley claim" by the Court of Appeals throughout its opinion.
Barnes, 58 F.3d at 974.
12 Id. at 973.
13Id.
14 Id. at 973-74.
15 Id. at 974.
16 Id. at 979.
